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Abstract
Introduction. The concept of a “subject of behavior” (SB) was formulated within 
the system-evolutionary theory in systemic psychophysiology. It is argued that the 
development of the concept of SB requires describing other components of this 
internally consistent theory.
Theoretical Review. This section reviews the theoretical and empirical grounds used by 
V.B. Shvyrkov to formulate the original foundations of the concepts of SB and “state of the 
subject of behavior” (SSB). SB is defined as the whole set of functional systems (elements 
of subjective experience) comprising memory. SSB is defined as a section of functional 
systems (part of the whole set) that are formed at different stages of individual 
development and simultaneously actualized in order to provide the deployment of 
a certain step of the behavioral continuum. Behavior is considered as the dynamics 
of SSBs, i.e. the transition from the state corresponding to one behavioral act of the 
continuum to the state corresponding to the next behavioral act.
Results. This section reviews the results of theoretical and empirical development 
of the concepts of SB and SSB that was aimed to expand their factually supported 
meaning. This development has been implemented via the research paradigm of 
system psychophysiology representing a field of multidisciplinary studies focused on 
the mechanisms of formation and actualisation of experience in human and other 
animals during individual and collective behavior. I review neurogenetic bases of 
experience formation; dynamics of the formation of the structure of experience within 
a strategic game; variability of SSBs during consequent behaviors; the role of learning 
history during formation of the structure of experience; specific characteristics of various 
domains of experience; the unified theory of consciousness and emotion along with 
its implications; dynamics of SSBs underlying regression; properties of various forms 
of social interaction in individuals with holistic and analytical mentalities; the system 
mechanisms of moral judgement of actions; and results of mathematical modelling 
of SB formation.
Conclusions. Results of the reviewed studies of SB and SSB demonstrate heuristic 
value of these concepts and their potential as methodological tools for coordinated 
development in various fields of psychology and neuroscience.
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Highlights
► Subjective experience is represented by the models of individual and collective 
interactions with the environment, including the social environment, i.e. the 
systems (elements of subjective experience) that are formed in sequential acts of learning 
throughout the life span; the whole set of these systems form an individual’s “subject 
of behavior” (SB).
► Current findings from interdisciplinary research of the structure of experience 
and its actualization, which is described as the transition from one “state of the 
subject of behavior” (SSB) (a specific set of systems actualized in a certain action) 
to another SSB, suggest that the concept of SB and SSB have great potential for 
development in psychology and neuroscience, integrating knowledge obtained 
from the studies of brain activity, behavior dynamics, and mentality in terms of the 
system-evolutionary theory.
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Introduction
The concept of “subject of behavior” is a component of the system-evolutionary 
theory formulated by Shvyrkov as a development of the theory of functional 
systems of P. K. Anokhin in psychology, neuroscience and psychophysiology. It is 
clear that the disclosure of this concept involves at least a brief description of the 
other components of this internally consistent theory. In this article, I will start 
with this description, and then give a definition of the subject of behavior and its 
dynamics (in the process of unfolding of the behavioral continuum) as it was done 
by Vyacheslav Borisovich Shvyrkov. In the last part of the article I will describe 
the further development of this concept and the expansion of its empirically 
grounded content which were carried out in the course of realization of the 
multidisciplinary research program of the “Systemic Psychophysiology” scientific 
school [1, 2, 3, 4], formed on the basis of the laboratory of psychophysiology 
named after V. B. Shvyrkov at the Institute for Psychology, Russian Academy of 
Sciences.
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Тheoretical Review
System-evolutionary theory and the concept of «subject of behavior» as 
its component
As the most important components of the factual basis of the system-
evolutionary theory, V. Shvyrkov [1] considered: a) the establishment of specia-
lization of neurones of different brain structures in relation to the systems 
formed during the mastery of behavioral acts at successive stages of individual 
development; b) the discovery of empirical arguments in favor of the fact that new 
organization of neurones, the impulses of which provide accomplishing a useful 
result of emerging behavior, is formed by selecting these neurons in the process 
of learning from the previously impulsively inactive (“silent”) cells.; c) finding out 
the fact of simultaneous activation of neurones specialized in relation to systems 
of different “ages” (i.e. formed at different – early and late – stages of individual 
development), in the implementation of any behavior. Integration of these and 
other facts with the data and concepts available in psychology, physiology, 
neuroscience, ethology, sociology, genetics, anthropology, etc., allowed us to 
formulate the concepts of the system-evolutionary theory as follows.
“By interacting with the environment, the body deploys a genetic program 
of its own life cycle. Before the appearance of nervous system, interactions can 
be described by the following formula: genome <-> body <-> environment. The 
emergence of a developed nervous system (and the major part of the individual's 
genome is expressed in the cells of this very system) causes the modification of 
the above formula, turning it into: genome <-> brain <-> body <-> environment. 
Based on this modification, B. Shvyrkov considered the behavior as unfolding of 
the genetic program of the life cycle, which is “expressed” mainly in neurones. 
The nervous system in this case can be described not as a “body”, but as 
a “subjective screen”, which was formed during the evolution between the genetic 
program and its implementation, provided by bodily processes and changes in 
the interaction of the body with the environment” [5, p. 11–12].
“From the standpoint of these concepts, neurone is not a “coding element” 
or “combiner”, but an “organism”, which meets its needs with the help of metabolites, 
which come to it from other neurones, glial and other cells. Neurone impulse 
transmission occurs when there is a mismatch between the flow of metabolites 
from other cells and the metabolic needs of the neurone. These needs, in a situation 
of mismatch, determine the neural implementation of a special (impulse activity) 
way to change its connections with other cells, that at the whole organism level 
can (in case of activity coordination between this and many other neurones) 
act as an unfolding of individual behavior, aimed at achieving a holistic result, 
and provide “need-related” change in metabolic (including synaptic) inflow to 
this (and other) neurone(s).
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The structure of “innate acts” manifests the history of adaptive interactions 
between organism and environment in the course of evolution. The neurones 
specialized in the systems of these acts are found more frequently in the relatively 
older structures of the central nervous system.
In the cortical structures of the brain there is a significant reserve of “silent” 
neurones. These cells are employed to form new behavioral acts. A set of these 
cells if selected from the previously silent neurones that provide activations in 
the test acts, and only those cells are selected whose activation provides the 
result of the formed act. Fixation of the new act system is realized through 
specialization of reserve neurones in relation to this system and strengthening 
of cell connections of new and previously formed behavior (this very condense 
formulation of the idea of the patterns of a new behavior formation was called 
the system-selection hypothesis of learning) [6, p. 125].
The systems of acts of behavior accumulated in the phylo- and ontogeny 
form the structure of the individual’s subjective world. In this world there are no 
special neural “mechanisms of perception”, “movements control”, etc. Therefore, 
the analysis of the systemic specializations’ composition and the dynamics of 
the neural impulsation can be considered an objective method for studying the 
structure and dynamics of the subjective world per se.
The nature of the implemented behavior is associated with a set of memory-
extracted and simultaneously activated systems of different “ages”, and their 
relationships (intersystemic ones) can be studied using both qualitative and 
quantitative methods.
“The emergence of human consciousness is inextricably linked with the 
formation of human community. The formation of the latter, probably, caused even 
greater modification of the relationships between the organism (person) and the 
environment than the development of the nervous system. The new relations are 
expressed by the following formula: genome < - > brain < - > body < - > cultural 
environment < - > society < - > universe. Therefore, the idea of the structure of 
the subjective world of a human being can be obtained by comparing the data 
obtained both with the help of brain activity mapping, and through the analysis 
of the structure of social consciousness, which elements are “assimilated” by the 
individual and transformed into individual knowledge. These elements include 
knowledge about “mental processes”, such as perception, will, emotions, etc., 
which are actually products of social consciousness, formed as characteristics 
of the individuals’ external behavior for practical purposes of the organization 
of interactions between society members. Not only the above, but also other 
concepts that describe the subjective reality, probably correspond to certain 
systemic states. It is these systems, and not from other “processes” (different for 
different psychologists) that constitute an individual’s subjective world. A study 
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of the systemic states and “intersystemic relations algebra” can be considered 
to be a general task of systemic psychophysiology” [5, p. 13].
The structure of the subjective world and the subject of behavior
The conclusion of fundamental importance for psychophysiology, which fol-
lows from the above, is that the study of brain activity, especially its individual 
neurones, is the way to an objective analysis of subjective reflection. This is so 
because the specialization of neurones with respect to the elements of individual 
experience (functional systems) means that their activity reflects not the outside 
world as such, but the connections, interaction with the individual. Therefore, 
studying the systemic specialization of neurones is an adequate method for the 
description of the subjective world proper.
From the considered positions, the subjective world turns out to be a structure 
that, as noted above, includes functional systems accumulated in the course of 
evolution1 and individual development.
In this regard, the term “subject of behavior” refers to the entire set of 
functional systems that make up the memory of the individual. The "the subject 
of behavior state" is understood as a part of this set – a set of systems formed 
at different stages of individual development and simultaneously actualized to 
1 “Accumulated in evolution in comparison with” individually specific “does not imply that the first 
are given to the individual as ready-made “bricks” of the structure of individual memory and in this 
sense are innate. There is considerable stock of literature devoted to the analysis of the meaning of 
the seemingly clear term “innate”. It is effectively integrated in the theoretical work of R. Samuels [7]. 
As Samuels, in particular, notes, properties are often considered innate, if they are not acquired. Acquired 
are such properties that appeared during a certain period of development of the individual, until which 
they were absent. From the standpoint of this “perfectly sound understanding of acquisition», “all 
the cognitive structures are acquired”, or let us formulate it differently – if “innate properties are 
those that are not acquired”, then “there are no innate cognitive properties” [7, pp. 136, 137]. Our 
systemogenetic views are consistent with this approach. In accordance with them, any relationship 
with the environment, even the one that is species-specific (peculiar to all individuals of this species) 
as well as individually specific ones (appearing in connection with the peculiarities of the individual 
life history in some of the species representatives, but not in other individuals) is provided by the 
activity of specialized neurones, and their specialization occurs in the process of learning. This means 
that it is necessarily formed in the process of individual development, which represents a sequence of 
systemogenesis. In other words, any “innate” behavior does not exist initially in the form of a ready-
made “brick” (“body part”, “alphabet”, integration, network, system, etc.), but is formed in the process 
of individual development, is in this sense acquired and carries the features of this development (see, 
for example: [8]). As for the difference between species-specific and individual-specific behavior, we 
can say the following. In early ontogenesis different groups of specialized neurones are formed due 
to selection. Then, in the process of learning (systemogenesis) the second stage of selection gets 
shaped, culminating in the specialization of the neurone in relation to the system of a particular act. 
Apparently, the pre-specialization of neurones intended for ancient systems of species-specific acts, 
in contrast to individually specific ones, is relatively rigid (but not absolute; see, for example: [9]) and 
determines what specific act they will be specialized for in the process of learning.
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ensure the deployment of a specific stage of the behavioral continuum. A set 
of systems of different “age”, the actualization of which constitutes the basis for 
achieving an adaptive result of a particular act of behavior, represents a unit of 
individual experience, and the system represents its element.
The dynamics of the subjective world as shift of the subjects of behavior 
states
“Behavior can be understood as an unfolding of a behavioural continuum, 
that is, a sequence of behavioural acts in which an individual act appears to 
be part of a continuum concluded between two outcomes: the preceding and 
the given acts. Thus, adjacent acts are joined by the transitional processes that 
unite them, which simultaneously represent an assessment of the result achieved 
in the previous act and the organization associated with this assessment, with 
planning of the next act” [10, p. 263]. Then the dynamics of the subjective world 
becomes a transition from one state of the subject of behavior to another in 
the behavioral acts shifts, which correspond to these states, and also represents 
the transitional processes, as a substitution of one set of systems with another.
Results
Experimental and theoretical development of ideas about the subject of 
behavior and its states
Below one can see representative examples that demonstrate the results of 
the development of ideas about the subject of behavior and its states in the 
scientific school “System psychophysiology” briefly discussed above (4; look 
http://www.ipras.ru/cntnt/rus/institut_p/nauchnye_s/nauchnaya_2.html).
Neurogenetic patterns of the experience structure formation 
We have demonstrated that the expression of early genes, in particular, the 
early C-fos gene, can serve as a sign of the process of neurone specialization 
formation in relation to systems that through the learning process get included 
in the structure of experience characterizing the subject of behavior. It was 
found that the distribution of the expression product of this gene (protein 
c-Fos – transcriptional factor, inducing changes in the expression of other 
genes and leading to changes in the protein phenotype of the neuron) in 
the animal brain corresponds to the distribution of neurones specialized 
in relation to the acquired element of the experience of food-seeking 
behavior [11]. It was found that the subject of behavior state (the composition 
of actualized systems) in learning depends on the experience that the 
animal possessed before training [12]; the organization of the experience 
formed before this episode of learning is modified by learning through the 
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processes of accommodation reconsolidation [13, 14]. Thus, the subject of 
behavior in learning is modified both by the inclusion of new systems in its 
composition, and by the reorganization of systems formed at the previous 
stages of individual development.
The dynamics of the experience structure formation in the strategic game and 
the problem of the rational vs. intuitive
In the descriptions of formation patterns and dynamics of sets of systems 
typical for certain states of the subject of behavior, the concepts of “opposition” 
or “reciprocity” are used, denoting a complete or partial ban on the simultaneous 
actualization of interacting systems, as well as the concept of “synergy” as 
a characteristic of systems juxtaposition that provides the possibility of their 
simultaneous actualization in one set.
The use of mathematical apparatus of relational algebra [15] gave grounds 
for a more detailed consideration of these relations. In studies of the formation 
of two zero-sum and full-information partners in the strategic game, two groups 
of relations between the components of experience were identified. The first 
group of relations provides a sequence of components actualization, linking 
them into a “semantic propositional network” (SPN), which represents “strict 
order” relations, forming stable linear sequences and “non-strict order” 
relations that create loops and cycles on SPN [16]. The relations of the second 
group form a “semantic associative network” (SAN); they link components 
into groups or define demarcation between sets of components, restricting 
or prohibiting simultaneous updating of some of these sets. It is established 
that the processes of formation of SPN and SAN are asynchronous. Studies 
show that in similar behavioral situations different states of the subject of 
behavior get shaped on a consistent basis and the order of change of these 
states in individuals prone to predominantly “rational” or “intuitive” method 
of solving test problems, differs [17].
Variability the subject of behavior states in successive implementations of 
behavior
Insofar as neurones are specialized with respect to systems, with the help of 
recording the impulses of neurones in the unfolding of behavior, it is possible 
to establish what kind of system – elements of experience are actualized at 
each of the behavioral stages. It was found out that in the implementation 
of this behavioral act the subject of behavior state is represented as a group 
of systems, invariably (in all implementations) actualized in the unfolding of 
this act, and a group of systems, the composition of which varies from one 
implementation of the same looking act to another. At the same time, the 
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systems of the second group can always be involved in other acts of individual 
behavior. The variability of the subject of the behavior state characteristic 
of this act is associated with the complexity of intersystem and interneuron 
relations, which, apparently, can not be reproduced twice in an exact form. 
Indeed, even if we use the criterion of motor characteristics, re-implementing 
of the acts turns out to be “repetition without repetition” [18]. P. Anokhin [19] 
also stressed that the parameters of the result obtained in the implementation 
of behavior can not match the model formed in the acceptor of the action 
results with “mathematical accuracy”.
Modification of the subject of behavior state means that when reproducing 
externally “the same” action, subjective world is not the same. The analysis of 
impulse activation of brain cells, representing the actualization of those systems, 
in regards to which these cells are specialized, allows to reveal qualitative and 
quantitative regularities, describing the dynamics of the state of the elements 
of experience, which determines the specified variability of the subjective 
world. Based on the data obtained in the course of such an analysis [20], it 
is established, for example, that 1) the severity of changes in the subject of 
behavior state in the implementation of successive implementations of the 
same (by the criterion of the achieved result) behavior is associated with the 
history of the formation of this behavior in learning and that 2) the variability 
affects relatively “newer” systems, i.e. those that were formed at later stages 
of individual development.
It was discovered that the subject of behavior state changes not only in 
successive implementations of externally identical behavior after changing 
the method of obtaining the result, but also when considering the states at 
much longer intervals. Thus, in animals, the lobes of neurones specialized in 
the approach to the pedal (pressing on which leads to appearance of a full 
feeder) and with respect to the approach to the feeder differed between the 
first and second weeks of the experiment with instrumental food-seeking 
behavior of animals [21]. 
Therefore, similarly looking acts of behavior at different stages of learning 
can correspond to different subject of behavior states. It is also found that 
changes in the subject of behavior state at successive stages of memory 
consolidation have an impact not only on the composition of activated systems, 
but also on the relations between the systems – intersystemic relations [22].
The subject of behavior state and the history of learning
We have found that different sequences of the stages of the same cyclic 
instrumental behavior are characterized by different actualization of the systems 
that as a result of learning make up the subject of behavior state. The results 
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showed that these differences relate to the above-mentioned dynamics of 
inter-systemic relations, in this case – the relations between the systems of 
the current behavior and systems of other behaviors implemented in the 
same environment. It is shown that in the nonspecific activity of specialized 
neurones (that reflects the aforementioned intersystem relations) the history 
of behavior formation is recorded, i.e. this activity (and hence intersystem 
relations) differs when we compare animals whose resulting behavior has 
a different history of formation [23].
In other experiments, it was discovered that the characteristics of the subject 
of behavior state are related to how the animal is trained to this (similarly-
looking) behavior: in one or many stages. After multi-stage animal training 
in instrumental food-seeking behavior, this behavior activated more neurons 
involved that specialized in acts formed in the training of this behavior (neurones 
of “new” systems) than it happened in animals that learned similar behavior 
in one session [24].
The subject of behavior state and domains of individual experience
In special experiments conducted with the registration of neuronal 
activity in animals, we analyzed the relationship between different domains 
of individual experience (by which we mean sets of systems related to the 
commonality of the results achieved). It was found that systems from the 
domain of one form of behavior can be updated when performing acts of 
another domain. The differences in the number of relations between the 
systems of one domain of individual experience and systems belonging to 
different domains [25] are revealed. Thus, it is confirmed that the state of the 
subject of behavior includes systems of acts of the same form of behavior as 
well as the system of acts of other forms of behavior in an actualized form.
Relations between different domains of experience were studied in humans 
as well: they were studied in the experiments with semantic priming [26]. It is 
shown, in particular, that an essential factor determining the characteristics 
of the state of the subject of behavior is the number of systems in the 
domain of experience, the elements of which are actualized as a part of the 
composition of this state.
Systems of different “age” in the structure of the subject of behavior states 
and their psychological characteristics: a unified concept of consciousness and 
emotions
The unified concept of consciousness and emotions that we sugges-
ted [27–31] uses a non-disjunctive approach to the analysis of the problem 
of consciousness and emotions. The essential moment for the theory 
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is the statement reasoned by us and other authors, according to which 
successive systemogenesis, the formation of new systems in the processes 
of learning throughout individual development, is associated with an in-
crease in the differentiation of the interaction of the individual and the 
environment. “Consciousness and emotions are the characteristics of different 
systems that are part of the subject of behavior state, which belong to different 
levels of the system organization of behavior. These levels are transformed 
stages of development of the individual, which correspond to relatively 
higher and lower levels of systemic differentiation. Emotions characterize 
the actualization of relatively “old” systems formed at the earliest stages of 
ontogenesis and correlated with the minimum level of differentiation: “good – 
bad” (approach – withdrawal). Consciousness characterizes the actualization 
of those relatively “new” systems, the formation of which in the later stages 
of ontogenesis provides an increase in the differentiation of individual’s 
interactions” [32, p. 16–17]. In a number of experiments it was demonstrated 
that the change in expression of more or less differentiated systems in the 
state of the subject of leads to a corresponding change in the severity of 
these characteristics.
For over than twenty years we have been using this theory for the 
formulation of hypotheses and interpretation of results in various problem fields 
of psychology. An example of its application to the study of the connections 
between the language, the development of behavior in ontogenesis and 
emotions represented in a series of works [33–35], in which it is shown that 
if a person is offered to imagine (mentally realize) early-formed types of 
behavior, for example, those associated with olfactory and taste sensations 
or sensations of the skin, this person will assess the emotions that arise in 
this case as more intense than when he or she is presented with late-formed 
types of behaviors associated with visual, auditory or tactile sensations.
The difference is associated with different contributions (larger for the 
types of behavior of the first group) of low-differentiated systems in the 
subject of behavior state associated with the actualization of experience in 
the internal plan. In addition, the decision-making time when assessing the 
presented behavior also corresponded with the characteristics of the subject 
of behavior state: if a person represented early-formed behaviors, he or she 
evaluated them faster than late-formed ones. This pattern was probably due 
to the fact that earlier formed behaviors are provided with a smaller number 
of functional systems, than the ones generated later, and the updating of 
a smaller number of systems takes less time.
Another example is our formulation of the ideas about the system basis 
of regression.
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Reversible dedifferentiation as a characteristic of the subject of behavior state 
typical of regression
Regression is usually understood as a decrease in the “level of organization” 
of behavior, a kind of return of the individual to the earlier stages of 
development. We conducted both theoretical and empirical analysis of 
the dynamics of system organization of behavior, based on the results of 
interdisciplinary research (from neurodevelopmental and neurophysiological 
studies in animals to studies of prosocial behavior in healthy adults and children, 
and also people suffering from chronic disease) to conditions in which there 
is regression: stress, illness, learning disability, emotional status and alcohol 
intoxication [36–40], allowed us to detect the similarity of the regularities 
underlying regression in these situations. In all of these situations, the subject 
of behavior state could be described as reversible dedifferentiation: a transient 
relative increase of expression of low-differentiated systems in the actualized 
experience. We have argued that it is the systemic (“developmental”) value 
of dedifferentiation, “phenomenologically described as regression and being 
a common mechanism for restructuring the interaction of the organism with 
the environment in different situations in which past patterns of behavior 
have become ineffective, is the most significant factor that plays role not 
only in its consolidation it the course of evolution as a component of stress 
adaptation, but also in general its occurrence in those situations, which involve 
the formation of a new and major modification of existing adaptations in 
a changing external and/or internal environment” [40, p. 87].
Holistic and analytic nature of thinking as a culturally specified characteristic 
of the subject of behavior
A large amount of data accommodated in the literature allows us to believe 
that one of the key characteristics of the human mentality, including the 
fact of its cultural or subcultural embeddedness, is the analyticity–holisticity 
of thinking [41, 42]. Analyzing the co-evolution of the mentality types and 
institutional matrices, we can argue in favor of the predominant development 
of holistic strategies in non–Western countries, which are dominated by 
cooperative forms of interaction, and of analytical ones in the West, with 
a predominance of competitive forms of interaction [43, 44].
We have demonstrated that the systemic organization of behavior 
associated with competitive and cooperative forms of social interaction is 
different for subjects with analytical and holistic thinking. It turned out, that 
the holistic subjects expressed greater sensitivity to different forms of social 
interaction [45, 46]. It is revealed that for subjects with analytical thinking the 
process of actualization of systems within the subject of behavior state goes 
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on faster in competitive forms of interaction, and for subjects with holistic 
thinking – in cooperative ones.
The subject of behavior and moral assessment of actions
Moral assessment of actions is an important component of adaptive human 
behavior in society and is viewed from our point of view as a charac teristic 
of the individual’s integral behavior [9]. Features of moral assessment are 
determined by the set of systems that make up the structure of the subject’s 
experience, and inter-system relationships that are associated with assess-
ment (self-report) of one’s own behavior with the eyes of an external “ob-
server” (society). Moral assessments change with age and are specific for men 
and women [47, 48], as well as for representatives of different cultures [48]. 
Our results indicate that the moral assessment is based on the actualization 
of systems of different ages and degrees of differentiation: intuitive assess-
ment of actions, which the subject learns from an early age, is based on 
the actualization of mostly low-differentiated experience and takes place 
in a similar form among representatives of different socio-cultural groups; 
rational evaluation of actions is provided mainly by actualization of highly 
differentiated experience, formed at later stages of individual development 
of the subject, and has a pronounced socio-cultural specificity. Using alcohol 
as a factor of controlled experimental influence on the subject of behavior 
state (selective oppression of actualization of the most differentiated systems), 
we have demonstrated that moral assessment is carried out mainly intuitively 
on the basis of actualization of low-differentiated systems, in the very first 
place alcohol inhibits the processes of rational reasoning, without disturbing 
the intuitive assessment of actions [49]. In addition, in the situation of moral 
evaluation, alcohol intake was associated with changes in the dynamics of 
the heart rate (increase in heart rate and decrease in RR-interval variability), 
which can be considered a physiological indicator of systemic dedifferentia-
tion – a reversible decrease in the contribution of the activity of highly dif-
ferentiated systems to behavior [50, 51].
We also analyzed the formation of a sense of justice in 4–11 years old 
children in terms of changes in the subject of behavior. The analysis is based 
on the results of the study of solutions of moral dilemmas “friend” – “stranger” 
in the situation of the implementation of behavior aimed at coordinating the 
opponent's goals: providing assistance to a member of his group when one 
is not obliged to, because he is a “friend”, and vital assistance to a member 
of another group. The arguments are given that the decision in favor of 
“friend” is based on the actualization of the older systems that underlie 
parochial altruism, nepotism, etc., while the basis of the choice of assistance 
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to the “stranger” is the actualization of the later formed systems. In favor 
of this assumption, evidence suggests that older children prefer to help 
the “stranger” than younger children much more often [52]. The subject of 
behavior state in the implementation of later formed behavior (decision in 
favor of “stranger”) is characterized by a pronounced “intersystem mismatch”, 
which is manifested in a greater value of the index of vegetative balance in 
children, who more often side with a “stranger” than in children, who more 
often side with their “friend”. Probably, this mismatch reflects the processes of 
learning and exists due to the implementation of the newly formed behavior, 
provided by the actualization of systems of different age, aimed at achieving 
previously agreed goals [53]. It can be assumed that an important role in the 
actual subject of behavior state is played by conscious control of one's own 
behavior, i.e. an internal report «in front of the society» (see above – “obser-
ving” society) on the compliance with moral norms, i.e. on compliance of 
the result achieved by an individual with the “collective result” of society [9]. 
Thus, the decrease in the level of conscious control of one's own behavior in 
the absence of visible external control in the face of the experimenter dur-
ing the solution of moral dilemmas leads to the implementation of earlier 
formed behavior, an increase in the share of support to one’s “friend” [54]. 
Moreover, stress, which blocks the actualization of more differentiated systems 
of behavior that was formed relatively late [38], causes regression of adults, as 
a rule, in the control of choosing the option of vital assistance to a member 
of someone else's group – to an “alien”, to the “childish” method of making 
decisions: “my close people are always right” [55].
Mathematical modeling of patterns of the subject’s of behavior formation 
and the dynamics of its state
With the help of mathematical modeling it was shown that the subject, by 
actively interacting with the environment in which it is located, spontaneously 
transforms it so that the objective laws of the environment change for him in 
the process of his activity in this environment [56]. In particular, the probability 
of occurrence of a certain situation in the environment (for example, the 
appearance of a “food object” in the field of view) is not fixed, but depends on 
the behavior of the subject and his skills of interaction with the environment 
and can significantly change in the learning process. Similarly, the regularities 
of the action – result ratio vary greatly: the probability of achieving the goal 
by a certain action (for example, the probability of successfully approaching 
the object from the left by the action of turning to the left).
There are some arguments in favor of the fact that it is necessary to 
study the behavior of the active subject by the method of immersion into 
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the environment [57], and not, for example, by the method of presenting 
incentives, in which the laws of the environment are fixed, and the subject 
is deprived of the opportunity to influence the environment. The results of 
the study of the behavior of model agents are consistent with the results 
obtained by us (see above) in the study of “natural” agents – people and 
animals: individuals who have a different history of formation of the subject 
of behavior structure and placed in the same environment, interact with it 
in different ways, and the laws of this environment are different for them 
depending on what skills they have learned in it [56].
In the research with the help of using mathematical modeling of the 
dynamics of the subject of behavior state, it is shown that if the actualization 
of the elements of experience (systems) is primary and determines the 
behavior, i.e. the dynamics of actualization of the elements of experience has 
immanent causes and is not determined solely by the external situation, the 
behavior can have fractal characteristics. Such a pattern can be considered 
in connection with the mechanism of “internal causality” and activity in 
the subject [58].
Conclusions
The above review of the results (both theoretical and empirical) of the use 
of the concept of “subject of behavior” and “the subject of behavior state” 
showed that they can be applied in order to
 − analyze the laws of formation and actualization of the subjective experience 
of people and animals in individual and collective (competitive and 
cooperative) behavior; 
 − interpret the results obtained in field and model experiments;
 − to study prosocial behavior in adults (belonging to different cultures 
and social groups) and its development in ontogenesis; 
 −  to identify the mechanisms of influence of stress and alcohol on the 
systemic organization of behavior;
 − to form a system-evolutionary understanding of the relationship of 
consciousness and emotions, as well as the value of regression as 
a stage of development;
 − to examine the relationships between language acquisition and the 
development of behavior in ontogenesis and emotions;
 −  to describe differences between behaviors of approaching and avoidance 
as specifics of the properties of systems belonging to the matching 
domain experience;
 − to establish a link between the history of mastering a certain behavior 
and the structure of the experience underlying this behavior; etc.
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Analysis of the results of using the concepts of “subject of behavior” and “the 
subject of behavior state” shows that they can be successfully used to conduct 
research in a variety of problem fields of psychology and neuroscience, and 
also demonstrates the high heuristic efficiency of these concepts.
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